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WHAT'S DRIVING ACQUISITIONS? AN IN-DEPTH
ANALYSIS OF CEO DRIVERS DETERMINING MODERN
FIRM ACQUISITION STRATEGY
Jennifer E. Wuebker *
INTRODUCTION
Firms pursuing growth strategies often perceive mergers and
acquisitions as the most efficient means to obtain additional re-
sources and increase firm value.1 But who decides which firm to
acquire and when? And what factors motivate this decision? Pref-
erably, the decision to acquire stems from shareholder value, with
strategic decision making confidently rooted in financial justifica-
tions projecting a positive return. Opportunistic synergies for the
aggregate entity moving forward should further attest to the
deal's value, with the ultimate decision resting in the hands of a
capable board. But researchers do not seem convinced. Over-
whelming evidence indicates that acquisitions tend to harm ac-
quiring firms more than they help.' This article argues certain
drivers impact the decision to acquire and examines current driv-
ers in acquisitions. Additionally, this article parses these drivers
into two broad categories-value-enhancing drivers and private-
interest drivers-and recommends that boards consider these
drivers in developing acquisitive strategy. Specifically, drivers
should guide board determination of the level of scrutiny to use
when evaluating target firms and board implementation of pro-
cess and payment changes capable of mitigating the potential
negative impacts of acquisition drivers.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable H. Christopher Mott, United States Bankruptcy Court,
Western District of Texas, Austin, Texas. J.D., 2015, University of Richmond School of
Law; M.B.A., 2015, University of Richmond Robins School of Business; B.A., 2011, Univer-
sity of Richmond.
1. Carol Yeh-Yun Lin & Yu-Chen Wei, The Role of Business Ethics in Merger and
Acquisition Success: An Empirical Study, 69 J. Bus. ETHICS 95, 97 (2006) (stating that
acquisitions present the most efficient way for firms pursuing growth strategies to obtain
external human and financial resources as well as expand operational domain).
2. See infra Part II.
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Part I provides an overview of the acquisition landscape, in-
cluding a brief history of the prevalence and success of acquisi-
tions as well as an analysis of acquisitions today. Part II outlines
the acquisition process and highlights the importance and dy-
namics of decision making, both in principle and in practice. Part
III explores two theories of acquisitive strategy driving CEO deci-
sion making: value enhancement and private interest. Part IV
analyzes the implications of CEO personality and psychological
drivers on acquisition strategy and decision making. This article
argues that CEO traits are central decision drivers, but that no
particular set of traits can predict or determine the viability of an
acquisition. Further, current mechanisms aimed at protecting
against CEO greed remain insufficient to prevent the consumma-
tion of bad deals. The board of directors must understand and
systematically consider the impact of specific drivers, facing the
acquisition decision with higher scrutiny for CEOs exhibiting
multiple drivers or drivers with particular likelihood to impact
the acquisition's return on investment.
I. ACQUISITIONS: THE LANDSCAPE
Successfully integrated acquisitions can significantly increase
firm value for both the CEO and shareholders of the acquiring
firm.' Yet "acquisitions have been found to have a neutral to neg-
ative effect on the shareholder wealth of acquiring firms. 4 A ho-
3. See Cynthia E. Devers et al., Do They Walk the Talk? Gauging Acquiring CEO and
Director Confidence in the Value Creation Potential of Announced Acquisitions, 56 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 1679, 1680 (2013).
4. Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 103 (1997) (citing
Elazar Berkovitch & M.P. Narayanan, Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation,
28 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347, 347-62 (1993)). Berkovitch and Narayanan as-
sessed a database of 330 tender offers made between 1963 and 1988. Elazar Berkovitch &
M.P. Narcyanan, Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, 28 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347, 349 (1993). The sample was selected based on the following
criteria:
(1) the shares of both the acquirer and the target were traded on the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, (2) the price and/or
number of shares outstanding is available for each of the six days before the
event date, and (3) sufficient daily stock return data is available to estimate
the market model.
Id. at 353. The data came from the database of Michael Bradley and the Office of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of the SEC. Id. at 353 n.5. The authors hypothesized three motivations for
acquisitions: synergy, agency, and hubris, and considered the overall net value of acquisi-
tions. Id. at 347. The authors concluded that, on average, takeovers yield positive net val-
ues. Id. This positive value is directly correlated with the subset of target firm value, and
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listic understanding of decision drivers exhibited by CEOs in ac-
quiring firms and board processes in acquisitions today requires
an understanding of the evolution of acquisitions.
A. History of Acquisitions
Firms have been engaging in acquisitions for decades. The fre-
quency of these deals, however, has rapidly increased since the
early 1990s. Firms announced more acquisitions in 1995 than any
prior year,5 and in 2001, approximately 30% of the world's top or-
ganizations were considering a merger or acquisition.6 In the first
half of 2004, the total value of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A")
reached $394.2 billion.7 Similarly in 2004, firms completed ap-
proximately 30,000 acquisitions globally, equating to one such
transaction every eighteen minutes, with over $1.9 trillion in to-
tal value.' "In 2005, worldwide M&A volume surged to more than
$2.3 trillion, indicating a new wave of strategic deal making."9
B. Current Acquisition Landscape
Despite the downturn of the economy in 2008, firms worldwide
announced as many as 64,981 M&A in 2009.° 2014 proved to be
the "most active mergers and acquisitions market in years,"" re-
inforcing the importance of M&A today. In fact, a study conduct-
ed by Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate in 2008 noted that
"U.S. firms spent more than $3.4 trillion on over 12,000 mergers
negatively correlated with the subset of acquiring firm value, indicating the target firm
receives value while the acquiring firm actually suffers a net loss. See id. at 349.
5. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 103.
6. Lin & Wei, supra note 1, at 97.
7. Aleksey A. Tikhomirov & William D. Spangler, Neo-Charismatic Leadership and
the Fate of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Institutional Model of CEO Leadership, 17 J.
LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 44, 45 (2010).
8. Susan Cartwright & Richard Schoenberg, Thirty Years of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions Research: Recent Advances and Future Opportunities, 17 BRIT. J. MGMT. S1, S1
(2006).
9. Tikhomirov & Spangler, supra note 7, at 45.
10. Martin Spraggon & Virginia Bodolica, Post-Acquisition Structuring of CEO Pay
Packages: Incentives and Punishments, 9 STRATEGIC ORG. 187, 188 (2011) (stating that
these transactions were valued at $3.62 trillion).
11. Dana Mattioli & Dana Cimilluca, Deal Boom Feeds on Surging Stocks, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 17, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://wsj.com/articles/deal-boom-feeds-on-surging-stocks-1416
270817 (stating that "[a]t roughly $3.1 trillion, the current dollar volume of announced
deals and offers globally is higher than in any full year since 2007..."). For a graph of
U.S. and global trends in mergers and acquisitions, see Appendix A.
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during the last two decades."'2 These numbers continue to grow
rapidly. The Wall Street Journal recently reported more than
$3.4 trillion of M&A deal flow in 2014 alone.3 "The deal market is
on a tear," with current global takeover activity indicating a 32%
increase over last year's total.
14
Theoretically, this deal flow should result in substantial growth
in the value of the acquiring firms. Yet, acquiring shareholders
lost over $220 billion as a direct result of the announcement of
M&A bids between 1980 and 2001,"5 and acquisitions today may
prove to be less fruitful for these shareholders.6 Despite numer-
ous empirical studies and CEO attestations to the inherent value
of acquisitions, the past thirty years tell a different story.7 Acqui-
sitions have a history of producing negative average returns for
the acquiring firm.s
There is a consensus among empirical studies that acquisitions
enhance value for shareholders in target firms only.9 Conversely,
many acquisitions are value-neutral at best, and often unfavora-
ble, for acquiring firms.2" Richard Roll first formalized this notion
12. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfi-
dence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 21 (2008).
13. Dana Mattioli & Dana Cimilluca, To Last, M&A Boom Needs to Broaden, WALL
ST. J. (JAN. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/to-last-m-a-boom-needs-to-broaden-1420
130620 (according to Dealogic, "[tihat is the most since the height of the last deal boom in
2007, when there was a record $4.3 trillion of transactions").
14. Mattioli & Cimilluca, supra note 11.
15. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 12, at 21 (citing Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth De-
struction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger
Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757-58 (2005) (finding that, at the announcement of acquisitions,
acquiring-firm shareholders lost an average of $0.12 for every dollar spent for a total loss
of $240 billion between 1998 and 2001)).
16. See generally G. Alexandridis et al., Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around
the World: New Evidence, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1671 (2010).
17. See Cartwright & Schoenberg, supra note 8, at S4.
18. See id.
19. Rayna Brown & Neal Sarma, CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corpo-
rate Acquisitions, 59 J. ECON. & BUS. 358, 360 (2007) (suggesting that a number of "expla-
nations for this disappointing outcome for acquirers" exist).
20. Id. (citing Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 103, 110 (2001) (finding a positive abnormal return of 16% to targets (re-
markably consistent over time) and a negative, but insignificant abnormal return to ac-
quirers); Terry Walter & Raymond da Silva Rosa, Australian Mergers and Acquisitions
Since the 1980s: What Do We Know and What Remains to Be Done?, 29 AUSTL. J. MGMT.
(Special Issue) i, iv, ix (2004) (indicating that "the evidence is unequivocal ... target firm
shareholders benefit considerably" whereas significant decreases in acquirer share prices
coupled with long-term losses make reconciling acquisitions with the value-enhancing hy-
potheses difficult)); see also Alexandridis et al., supra note 16.
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and its nexus to the winner's curse in 1986 by linking a CEO's
propensity for overbidding to the negative returns for sharehold-
ers.22 "The implications of overconfidence for mergers and acquisi-
tions, however, are more subtle than mere overbidding.' 23 More
drivers play into the value balance.
Furthermore, market response to acquisition announcements
reflects the bane of the winner's curse; the acquirer's stock is al-
most always marked down.24 This creates an initial negative im-
pact on firm value and precipitates long-term devaluation. The
"adverse market reaction is reinforced by findings that acquisi-
tions lead to declines in the acquiror's longer-term profitability
and shareholder returns" in the future,5 suggesting that acquisi-
tions not only create complexities and hobble nimble firms, but
also cause lasting financial damage.
II. ACQUISITION STRATEGY: WHO DECIDES?
A. Acquisition Process
Acquisitions constitute one of the more central strategic deci-
sions made by executives." The process begins "with the emer-
gence of the acquisition idea and the evaluation and selection of
the target."27 Performance pressures and specialized industry
knowledge often make CEOs a common source for inception of the
acquisition idea,28 placing initial control of the process in the
21. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197,
200 (1986). The "winner's curse" focuses on the psychological effects of bidding environ-
ments and the proclivity for overbidding. Id. Because each bidder seeks to win, he or she
bids high, often higher than the true value. Id. This behavior is reinforced by the reward:
winning. Id. The winner of the auction, however, is in fact the loser because he or she has
overpaid, decreasing his or her overall value. Id. The curse assumes bidders focus more on
winning and less on rational decision making. Id.
22. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 12, at 21 (citing Roll, supra note 21, at 198) (find-
ing that in the process of overbidding, CEOs effectively transfer most of the value generat-
ed by the acquisition from the acquiring firm to the target firm).
23. Id.
24. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 103 ("[I]nvestors mark down the stock of
acquirors following takeover announcements."); see also Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at
360 ("[A] significant negative abnormal return accrues to bidding firms upon the an-
nouncement of a diversifying acquisition.") (citing Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial
Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 31-48 (1990)).
25. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 103 (citations omitted).
26. See id. at 120.
27. Tikhomirov & Spangler, supra note 7, at 45.
28. Id. at 46 (stating that the acquisition process "has a notorious aura of secrecy, par-
2015]
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CEO's hands. The board of directors may appoint a committee
charged with supervising the acquisition process, including due
diligence, negotiating price, managing announcement of the deal,
and orchestrating integration.29 The ultimate decision-making
process, however, remains murky.
B. Decision Making in Principle
Inappropriate decision making or integration, as well as poor
negotiation and pricing of the target firm, "can lead to inferior ac-
quisition outcomes."" As a result, careful, measured decision
making remains key. Although no set of particular guidelines ap-
ply to acquisition strategy, such decisions are often evaluated
based on three principles: (i) the degree to which the board and
management engaged in strategic planning; (ii) whether the
board and management fulfilled their fiduciary duty3 to the
firm's shareholders; and (iii) how well the board and management
integrate the target and recognize potential synergies. This
framework elicits a particular decision-making process. The
board should evaluate a proposed target acquisition for its fit
within the overall corporate strategy. If the target fits appropri-
ately, the board and management may pursue the target and en-
gage in due diligence.
C. Decision Making in Practice
"If shareholders could perfectly monitor and control the in-
vestment decisions of managers, acquisitions that reduce share-
holder wealth because they deliver managerial benefits would not
ticularly when the acquisition strategy is early in the making," creating deeper connec-
tions between CEO knowledge and decision making within the acquisition committee and
entrenching information asymmetry).
29. Id. at 45.
30. Cartwright & Schoenberg, supra note 8, at S3.
31. Management and the board are bound by the duty of care. See generally Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)) ("[A] director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the na-
ture of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty. [Where] there are no allega-
tions of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof ... it is presumed that the direc-
tors reached their business judgment in good faith. .. . 'While the Delaware cases use a
variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that




be allowed,"32 or at least the advent of such decisions would likely
decrease substantially. Managers of large, public firms, however,
typically receive only loose scrutiny."3 The CEO proves instru-
mental in the acquisition decision34 because boards give managers
considerable leeway in the formation of acquisition strategy.
3 5
Boards often fail to utilize forms of punishment, such as removal
or reduction of pay," as retribution for poor acquisition perfor-
mance. This perpetuates the often reckless acquisitive strategy of
CEOs.7 This parting from principle occurs for many reasons.
First, there remains a vast information gap between the CEO
on one hand and the board and shareholders on the other, even at
the inception of a proposed acquisition. Most aware of investment
or acquisition opportunities, CEOs often control the deal incep-
tion.38 Having seized this control, they often do not relinquish it at
any point in the process.39 This information asymmetry is fur-
thered by specialized industry knowledge and may prove difficult
for shareholders to rectify or overcome.4" Boards seem to give wide
deference to CEOs who appear most closely related to target op-
portunities, relying on the perceived expertise of the CEO to de-
termine the viability of an acquisition.
Second, few acquisition plans could survive without first receiv-
ing vigorous support and approval from the CEO. "It is virtually
inconceivable that terms of a major acquisition could proceed to
the board without the CEO's personal sponsorship."'" In fact, the
role of CEO disposition may be even greater with respect to ac-
quisition decision making than any other strategic planning or
decision-making process.42 By championing a deal, the CEO may
taint the board's perception. Whether weak, compliant, or in-
32. Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN.
31, 32 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Nina T. Dorata & Steven T. Petra, CEO Duality and Compensation in the Market
for Corporate Control, 34 MANAGERIAL FIN. 342, 343 (2008).
35. Morck et al., supra note 32.
36. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition
Process, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 7, 8 (1988).
37. See Morck et al., supra note 32.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See Yung-I Lou et al., Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 7
INT'L J. Bus. & FIN. REs. 29, 32 (2013).
40. Id.
41. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 107.
42. Id. at 120.
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volved, the CEO's endorsement will likely sway the board to ac-
cept that the deal is a good one,43 often without properly review-
ing the firm's due diligence." This can facilitate ineffective or
fruitless acquisitions with mediocre to non-existent shareholder
returns for the acquiring firm.
III. CEO DEAL DRIVERS
The CEO serves as the highest-ranking executive within a firm
and ultimately bears responsibility for the success or failure of
the firm.45 As a result, the CEO likely enjoys wide deference in
determining acquisition strategy. The CEO considers factors ug-
gesting that an acquisition will increase the value of the CEO's
firm. Part A outlines such factors, but proceeds to caution that
these factors may prove illusory.
But "[i]ndividual, group, and social factors, not efficient strate-
gic calculation, drive key decisions" in a firm,46 and the relation-
ship between the board and management can have vast implica-
tions in implementing acquisition strategy. Human factors
"clearly manifest themselves" in large-firm acquisition strate-
gies,47 and therefore merit careful consideration in order to un-
derstand why firms continue to acquire. Part B identifies and dis-
cusses factors that motivate CEO support of acquisitions but are
divorced from benefits that might accrue to the firm.
A. Value-Enhancement Drivers
One line of reasoning considers acquisitions based on their
purported value enhancement. These acquisition drivers share a
common notion: the motivation of acquisitive CEOs by the long-
term potential of acquisitions and pursuit of acquisitions believed
43. See Ranjay Gulati & James D. Westphal, Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects
of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures,
44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 473, 473, 480 (suggesting that "CEO-board relationships characterized
by independent board control reduce the likelihood of alliance formation by prompting dis-
trust between corporate leaders, while CEO-board cooperation in strategic decision mak-
ing appears to promote alliance formation by enhancing trust" and that trust in the CEO
may influence board decision making),
44. Id. at 501.
45. Emilia Peni, CEO and Chairperson Characteristics and Firm Performance, 18 J.
MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 185, 189 (2014).
46. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 105 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 119.
[Vol. 50:9
WHAT'S DRIVING ACQUISITIONS
to offer value-enhancing opportunities." Assuming the inherent
rationality of CEOs, value-enhancement drivers will only lead a
CEO to acquire a target firm when he or she confidently perceives
the acquisition holds strong potential for sustainable growth and
when he or she possesses the ability to achieve such potential.49
This type of driver is summarily manifested in four, distinct mo-
tivations: private synergies, access to superior information, mar-
ket-share growth, and CEO hubris.
1. Private Synergies
Private synergies reflect a CEO's notion that something specific
and unique about he target firm will mesh particularly well with
something inherent in the acquiring firm, creating added value
through the acquisition. CEOs will make acquisitions when they
obtain specific information indicating the presence of a particular
synergistic opportunity capable of creating enhanced value by ex-
ploiting complementary resources or capabilities."0 The decision to
acquire a target firm rests on whether that firm presents such
synergistic opportunities that will render the aggregate firm more
valuable than the sum of the individual firms.51
2. Access to Superior Information
Another potential driver for CEO acquisition strategy derives
from access to superior information. Under this line of thought,
the CEO believes that he or she possesses "asymmetric or superi-
or information" that permits the CEO to recognize potential more
aptly than others.52 The CEO believes he or she can capitalize-
through the acquisition-on opportunities competitors have not
yet realized.53 This drives the CEO to move forward without
48. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1682.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 1681.
51. Id.; see also Jeffrey. S. Harrison et al., Mergers and Acquisitions: A Value Creating
or Value Destroying Strategy, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
384, 384-408 (R. Edward Freeman et al. eds., 2001); Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4,
at 105 (finding that "commonalities or complementaries between the acquiror and target
enable the combined value of the firms to exceed their value as two independent entities"
and suggesting that synergistic opportunities exist); James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Ma-
honey, An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Corporate Charter Antitakeover Amend-
ments on Stockholder Wealth, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17, 21 (1993).
52. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1681.
53. Id. at 1681-82 (citations omitted).
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properly considering the risk or reward apparent in an acquisi-
tion and, perhaps prematurely, without proper vetting of poten-
tial targets. Further, this perceived private information may pre-
clude the CEO from rationally considering the input of the board,
mistakenly assuming that the board lacks cognizance of the same
information. Although the CEO could, and likely should, share
the information with the board, the CEO may not feel the board
will understand his or her unique take on the deal or may wish to
preserve the secrecy to further entrench his or her authority.
Opacity of information permits the CEO to start in charge and
stay in charge.
3. Market-Share Growth
Growth remains one of the most salient corporate goals. Per-
haps the quickest way for large firms, in particular, to achieve
such growth lies in capturing market share through acquisition.54
The CEO can simultaneously gain market share and decrease
competition through acquiring similar and competing firms.5 In
turn, increased scale permits the firm to explore cost-reduction
strategies.56 The CEO creates shareholder value through in-
creased leverage and decreased production costs, likely increasing
profits.7 Thus, it is no surprise that substantial growth may al-
lure CEOs into supporting more aggressive or risky acquisitions.
Economic theory supports this idea by positing that superior
firms seek out inferior firms for the value potential; inefficient
managers will be forced out by acquirers attempting to extract
untapped potential." Although the process of large firms engulf-
ing smaller firms often plays a role in the life cycle of corpora-
tions, acquiring firms do not always possess the superior man-
agement they envision. In fact, these firms often struggle to
integrate their targets.59 The post-acquisition entity proves too
54. See, e.g., Satish Shankar et al., How to Win in Emerging Markets, 49 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 19, 20-21 (2008) (reviewing the decision for Philip Morris to acquire Sam-
poerna and finding the firm experienced "an enormous success" with a jump in market
share of 1.5% to nearly 280/--enabling Philip Morris to become the market leader).
55. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1682.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 104.
59. See, e.g., Don Clark & Tess Stynes, Riverbed Agrees to be Bought Out by Thoma
Bravo for $3.6 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/riverbed-
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complex to recognize the perceived potential. As a result, the firm
becomes more fragmented, inefficient, and difficult to manage.
Regardless, the allure of larger market share likely plays a siza-
ble role in acquisitions driven by perceived value.
4. CEO Hubris Distorting Value-Enhancing Drivers
While each of the value drivers can contribute to a profitable
acquisition, each can prove illusory in a particular case, and the
probability that these drivers will constitute only illusions in-
creases with evidence of CEO hubris. Hubris is "exaggerated
pride or self-confidence,"6 often including overconfidence. This
overconfidence is intrinsic to the individual6' and can derive from
strong recent firm performance, media hype, or the measure of a
CEO's compensation relative to other directors or managers."
"Psychologists suggest that individuals are especially overconfi-
dent about outcomes they believe are under their control."63 Over-
confident CEOs often fall into the trap of predicting greater syn-
ergies between the target and acquiring firms than are
achievable.64 "[O]verconfident CEOs are likely to undertake more
acquisition [s],"" and prove more likely to engage in "value-
destroying" projects that dispassionate analysis would reject.66
Further, CEOs often make acquisitions because they overvalue
their own managerial skills and believe their managerial
strengths can resurrect a diminishing or fledgling target firm.67
This hubris encourages CEOs to acquire target firms based on the
agrees-to-be-bought-out-by-thoma-bravo-for-3-3-billion- 1418652793 (reporting that Riv-
erbed suffered financial hardship after a series of acquisitions culminating in apparent
"trouble integrating Opnet"-ultimately resulting in the firm's purchase by private equity
firm Thoma Bravo).
60. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting Hubris, WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)).
61. Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 363.
62. Id. at 361 (utilizing a measure of the difference between compensation of the CEO
and compensation of top management as an indicator of CEO over-confidence).
63. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 12, at 22 (citing James G. March & Zur Shapira,
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1404-18 (1987)).
64. Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 361.
65. Shantanu Dutta et al., CEO Power, M&A Decisions, and Market Reactions, 21 J.
MULTINATIONAL FIN. MGMT. 257, 258 (2011).
66. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 12, at 22.
67. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1682; see also Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4,
at 104 ("[A]cquiring managers overestimate their ability to extract value from acquisi-
tions.").
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purported ability of the CEO to successfully integrate the firms
and increase value through synergies." CEOs often fall victim to
gross overestimation of future value.9 CEO hubris likely increas-
es the probability that the CEO's confidence in profit from syner-
gies is unwarranted, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
CEO overvalues the information regarding the target firm and
overestimates his or her ability to capitalize on that information.
These dangers derive from innocent miscalculation driven by
arrogance or willful blindness or potential drawbacks. The next
set of drivers, however, are more pernicious.
B. Private-Interest Drivers
CEOs may be driven to acquire target firms by self-interest.
Scholars have begun to recognize that CEOs can derive substan-
tial compensation and personal benefits from acquisitions regard-
less of the return to shareholders or the measure of success or
failure of the acquisition.° Although it remains possible for execu-
tives to balance the interests of shareholders jointly with their
own, the likelihood that "executives may make decisions that sat-
isfy their own interests at the expense of the shareholders" still
weighs heavily.7' As a result, the board should not disregard per-
sonal drivers influencing CEO decision making. These personal
drivers often surface through greater compensation for the CEO,
a desire to engage in empire building, and job security.
1. Greater Compensation
Enhanced CEO compensation likely plays a pivotal role in de-
termining acquisition strategy. We know CEO compensation in-
creases following acquisitions,72 and compensation often surfaces
68. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1682.
69. Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 362 (finding that a CEO often believes the
company's equity is undervalued in the current market, causing the CEO to overvalue the
potential return on the proposed union of the firms).
70. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1683; Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 105;
see also DONALD DEPAMPHILLIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING
ACTIVITIES 31 (4th ed. 2007); Cartwright & Schoenberg, supra note 8, at S4 (indicating
that in 2000, studies showed 26% of U.S. cross-border acquisitions stemmed from manager
instigated deals focused on personal gain rather than shareholder value).
71. S. Trevis Certo et al., Board of Directors' Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Cor-
porate Acquisitions?, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 219, 221 (2008).
72. Id. at 223.
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as a prime motivation for driving acquisitions.73 Professors
Shantanu Dutta, Kenneth MacAulay, and Samir Saadi examined
incentive compensation in relation to M&A deals in over 1000
completed Canadian M&A mergers and acquisitions.4 These au-
thors found that M&A bonuses "are positively related to manage-
rial power: managers who have more board power are likely to
get substantially higher bonuses, to engage in larger deals, and to
have substantially smaller announcement returns."5 Perhaps
CEOs continue to pursue acquisitions despite a history of net
loss, in part, due to the allure of such bonuses.
Further, corporate acquisitions are often a crucial factor in de-
termining annual CEO compensation."6 Annual compensation
typically correlates with firm size, creating additional incentive to
increase firm size by any means." Because acquisitions induce
rapid firm growth, acquisitive CEOs achieve similarly rapidly
growing compensation packages;"8 CEOs may prove inclined to
make acquisitions to increase total firm size.79 Recent studies
have indicated this increase in compensation post-acquisition oc-
73. Dorata & Petra, supra note 34, at 342.
74. Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 265 tbl.1. ' This study considered all Canadian M&A
deals [occurring] between 1997 [and] 2005 and involv[ing] TSX-listed bidding com-
pan[ies]." Id. at 264. Importantly, this timeframe spans two large regulatory changes in
Canada impacting Canadian companies, the Dey Report in 1994 and the Toronto Stock
Exchange governance guidelines in 1995, as well as the time-period during which the
United States implemented Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. The authors required that all deals within
the study meet two criteria: (i) the deals were completed and (ii) the acquiring firm was
not a member of the financial industry. Id. The study did not eliminate acquiring firms
with multiple acquisitions during the period, nor did it discriminate based on the size of
the deal. Id.
75. Id. at 258 (quoting Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Horibar, CEO Compensation and In-
centives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 121 (2004)).
76. Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 258 (noting that a CEO can maximize compensation
in two ways: (1) increasing the size of the firm or (2) by stealing or expropriation); Detelin
Elenkov et al., Acquisition Returns, Increase in Firm Size, and Chief Executive Officer
Compensation: The Moderating Role of Monitoring, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J., 599, 599 (2002).
77. Kevin F. Hallock, The Relationship Between Company Size and CEO Pay, WORK
SPAN (Feb. 2011), https://www.ilr.cornell.edulsites/ilr.cornell.edulfiles/workspan/02-11-
Research-for-the-real-world_0.pdf (showing that for a 1% increase in company size, CEO
pay goes up by about one-third of 1%--meaning that for each 10% increase in company
size, annual CEO compensation increases by 3%.); see also Certo et al., supra note 71, at
220 (finding that director compensation packages increase following M&As); Dorata &
Petra, supra note 34, at 344 ("[Firm size is a significant influence on CEO rewards of ac-
quiring firms."); Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 264 ("Extant literature shows that firm size
directly influences CEO compensation levels.").
78. See Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1683.
79. See Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 258 (noting that maximizing firm size maximiz-
es compensation).
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curs irrespective of whether the acquisition created recognizable
value for the firm,s° suggesting CEOs endeavor to acquire target
firms to enhance their own managerial compensation rather than
increase overall shareholder value.8'
2. Empire Building
Perhaps in tandem with increased compensation lies the fear
that CEOs engage in acquisitive corporate strategy for the sake of
empire building.82 Not only do larger firm sizes foster firm-and
CEO-recognition and prestige, but increased firm size enhances
CEO discretion and bargaining power within the industry and
within the firm. 3 "[A] CEO can radically transform the size and
profile of the firm, perhaps instantly enabling it to enter the For-
tune 500 list," or break into a new or challenging industry previ-
ously barred.4 Understandably, CEOs may struggle to recognize
and differentiate between the social value in growing the size and
prestige of the firm versus the financial value of achieving a high
return on investment.5
Firm growth can increase a CEO's personal autonomy. Not on-
ly are acquisitions themselves complex deals, often requiring ex-
tensive periods of integration, but the resulting larger firms ex-
hibit increased internal complexity, creating opacity and
restricting outside monitoring and regulation." This permits the
firm to operate with fewer regulatory constraints so that it can
throw its weight around in the industry. It may also further viti-
ate the board and its ability to properly oversee corporate strate-
gy and play a substantial role in the decision-making process. As
80. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1683 (citing Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. & ECON. 119, 119-
43 (2004)).
81. Elenkov et al., supra note 76, at 600.
82. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 12, at 22 ("Empire-building, like overconfidence,
predicts heightened acquisitiveness to the detriment of shareholders, especially given
abundant internal resources."); see generally Jarrad Harford, Corporate Cash Reserves and
Acquisitions, 54 J. FIN. 1969 (1999).
83. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1683 (citing Donald C. Hambrick et al., Executive
Job Demands: New Insights for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors, 30
AcAD. MGMT. REV. 472, 472-91 (2005)).
84. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 4, at 120.
85. See id. at 110.
86. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1683 (citing Matt Bloom & George T. Milkovich, Re-
lationships Among Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance, 41 AcAD. MGMT.
REV. 283, 283-97 (1998)).
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a firm becomes more complex, the board may rely more heavily on
the CEO's expertise and insight, diluting the effect of the board
as a countermeasure against CEO greed.
3. Job Security
Not only does growth of the firm create attractive promotion
opportunities for junior managers and industry-wide opportuni-
ties for CEOs, but growth has become an expectation of CEO per-
formance." As a result, despite the inherent risk associated with
acquisitions, CEOs appear relatively unphased and are not ap-
prehensive about undertaking large deals.88 This may stem par-
tially from the need to achieve growth in order to meet external
and internal growth expectations, thereby improving the CEO's
prospects for remaining at the top.
Collectively, these personal drivers pose a potential threat to
the success of any acquisition and may prove aggravating factors
in tandem with certain value-enhancing drivers. As a result, the
board of directors should carefully consider the presence or ab-
sence of each driver and how these drivers might interplay to af-
fect the firm's acquisition strategy and process.
IV. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT
A. CEO Drivers Impact Acquisition Strategy
Given the range of decision making under the purview of a
CEO, it is fair to say that CEOs impact acquisition strategy. This
article argues one step further-that CEO drivers explain and in-
fluence acquisition strategies in large firms. The drivers detailed
above weigh on CEO decision making, fostering CEO dominance
and over-bidding on target firms, which in turn help to explain
why acquisitions are consummated despite low or negative re-
turns for shareholders.
87. See Morck et al., supra note 32, at 33.
88. Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 258.
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1. CEO Dominance
CEO dominance signifies "the ability of the CEO to impose his
or her overconfident views on the decisions of the firm."89 An in-
herently objective measure, dominance focuses on whether an in-
dividual can actually exert his or her influence over another indi-
vidual or group of individuals." As a result, dominance only has
meaning in a social or organizational context, such as in the con-
text of a CEO's relationship with the firm's board.91 "Only a pow-
erful CEO can impose his [or] her decision on a firm" and its
board,92 suggesting weaker boards or firms with weaker corporate
governance will have more powerful and dominant CEOs.93
Dominance carries huge implications in acquisition decision
making. Dominant CEOs can manipulate and maneuver the deci-
sion-making process, the acquisition committee, and the full
board. Dominant CEOs likely focus more on drivers such as com-
pensation, empire building, and diversification of personal assets.
Dominant CEOs may also leverage drivers such as private syner-
gies and CEO hubris, believing they can pressure the board to ei-
ther accept an M&A decision or afford greater deference by adopt-
ing a lower level of review.
2. Overbidding
Perhaps the largest harm to the shareholders caused by mis-
guided CEOs remains overbidding. CEOs often make offers sig-
nificantly above the market value of a target firm." This decreas-
es overall firm value and causes the firm to expend additional
capital without achieving any additional gain. According to Rich-
ard Roll, managers of bidding firms "infected by hubris" overpay
for target firms because they "overestimate their own ability to
run them."95 To the extent acquisitions serve personal objectives,
such as compensation or empire building, managers of bidding
89. Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 359.
90. Id. at 363.
91. See id. at 363-64.
92. Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 258.
93. Id. at 260.
94. See Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 361 (overbidding based on overconfidence);
Dorata & Petra, supra note 34, at 342 (overbidding based on personal benefit).
95. Morck et al., supra note 32, at 31 (citing Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of
Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 197 (1986)).
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firms are willing to pay more than the target firm is worth to fur-
ther these objectives.9"
B. Additional Drivers May Effect CEO Decision Making
In addition to the drivers discussed above, additional drivers
may impact CEO decision making. These factors stem from ori-
gins other than value enhancement or personal gain. These driv-
ers, though not of central focus here, warrant review to alert
boards of directors of potential mitigating or aggravating factors
that may merit consideration in the holistic review process.
Age and tenure. The age of the CEO may play a large role in his
or her acquisition strategy. Older CEOs may be more prone to se-
lecting strategies with hurdle rates or projected payoffs closely
aligned with, and markedly prior to, the CEO's planned retire-
ment.97 This gravely affects a firm's growth rate and direction.
Further, CEOs with more tenure may hold entrenched positions
within the firm and within the industry, enabling the CEO to
pursue personal interests.98 Experienced executives may have
more specific knowledge relating to both the firm and the indus-
try, permitting these executives to navigate acquisition decision
making more dexterously and, perhaps, exacerbating the infor-
mation asymmetry with the board.99
Ascribed social status. Ascribed social status is assigned to in-
dividuals without reference to innate differences or abilities.'
This driver is bestowed on individuals irrespective of individual
traits and often based on some irreversible fact, such as family
lineage or gender.1 ' CEOs with more ascribed status may prove
more elitist and connected, affording greater opportunities but
less need to "prove themselves." This may cause CEOs with such
status to evaluate M&A deals more evenly with little attention to
job security or compensation. Conversely, ascribed social status
may trigger increased hubris or overconfidence, exaggerating
overbidding and contributing to the likelihood of a bad deal.
96. Id.
97. Peni, supra note 45, at 188.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 199.
100. Michael Dowling et al., CEO Social Status and Acquisitiveness, 5 QUALITATIVE
RES. FIN. MKTS. 161, 162 (2013).
101. Id. at 163, 166.
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Gender. Some authors postulate that women's more cooperative
leadership style may not only prove more productive than men's
competitive nature, but suggests that women are more apt to rec-
ognize perceived synergies between target and acquiring firms,
thus elevating the probability of successful integration.2 In gen-
eral, firms led by female CEOs may outperform matched firms
with male executives.0 3 These characteristics may stand alone in
deal-making strategy or could serve as mitigating factors against
certain deal drivers.
Achieved social status. Achieved social status derives from in-
dividual accomplishments. Psychological research suggests high-
er status can induce overconfidence directly associated with high-
er average acquisitiveness.' This calls into mind the above
analysis regarding overconfidence and suggests that acquisitions
may be viewed as an opportunity more for the CEO to grow in
status than the firm to grow in size or stature. Additionally,
achieved status may contribute to specific drivers, such as CEO
hubris, and further complicate the board's understanding of just
what is behind the acquisition.
C. Boards of Directors Do Not Sufficiently Counteract Private
CEO Drivers
Some research hypothesizes that vigilant monitoring through
active institutional ownership, heightened board scrutiny, or pro-
portionally large numbers of independent directors can control
private CEO rewards tied to firm acquisitions. For example, one
study indicates that "[a] higher proportion of independent direc-
tors on the board mitigates the effect of CEO overconfidence and
CEO dominance and reduces the probability of the firm deciding
102. See Peni, supra note 45, at 198.
103. Id. at 186. The sample's empirical analysis consisted exclusively of S&P 500 firms.
Id. at 190. The authors omitted observations with insufficient data and proceeded with a
final sample consisting of 305 firms and 1525 firm-year observations. Id. The sample peri-
od extended from 2006 to 2010. Id. All data on CEO and Chairperson characteristics was
hand collected from the AuditAnalytics database. Id. In the case of data availability is-
sues, the executive data was acquired from the firms' annual reports and press releases.
Id. The authors obtained financial statement data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Id.
The authors analyzed the relationship between CEO or Chairperson characteristics and
firm performance with cross-sectional panel regressions. Id. at 194.
104. Dowling et al., supra note 100, at 164. See generally Malmendier & Tate, supra
note 12 (examining CEO overconfidence in merger decisions).
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to make an acquisition."1 5 Conversely, CEOs can more effectively
induce abusive acquisitions and corporate strategy when monitor-
ing proves lax.'°6 The fact that acquisitions continue to destroy
value so frequently demonstrates that board control and monitor-
ing, to date, has not worked.
D. Equity Ownership Is Insufficient to Curb Private CEO Drivers
Scholars have long emphasized the importance of aligning the
interests of the CEO with those of the firm and its sharehold-
ers.'7 In fact, "[mlanagement ownership of shares may be the
most effective deterrent to investments that dissipate market
value . . . .""' But some forms of equity compensation-
particularly options-provide upside potential without symmet-
rical downside penalties, exacerbating those drivers that encour-
age CEOs to make M&A deals that are risky to those who hold
common stock outright. The board should consider the effect equi-
ty compensation may have on CEO decision making and weigh
such compensation when considering the impact of deal drivers
that may be present.
E. Integrating Personality Analysis in CEO Decision Making
It is "incorrect to say that existing monitoring and control de-
vices keep managers from pursuing personal non-value-
maximizing objectives."'' 9 Acquisition decisions should be viewed
in the context of the total payoff structure and relative board
power."' The board can utilize the drivers discussed in this paper
to track potential CEO motivators in acquisition decision making
and determine the effect, if any, such drivers should have on
board consideration of individual transactions and acquisition de-
velopment processes.
105. Brown & Sarma, supra note 19, at 376.
106. Elenkov et al., supra note 76, at 601, 606.
107. Devers et al., supra note 3, at 1682.
108. Morck et al., supra note 32, at 32 (providing the caveat hat large firms recognize
this protection less as managers own fewer stocks relative to the size of the firm; the value
is somewhat superfluous).
109. Id.
110. Dutta et al., supra note 65, at 258.
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1. Process Changes: Shaping the Role of the Board
a. Earlier Board Involvement
Significant acquisitions necessarily involve the board at the ac-
quiring company.11' Too often, however, board involvement occurs
once the deal has effectively been made. In these instances, a
rubber stamp from the board remains the sole barrier between
the CEO and effectuation of the deal. This places the board in a
position where they must either derail the entire transaction or
simply acquiesce to the CEO's recommendation. To avoid this
trap, the board of directors should consider early involvement in
acquisition deals by instituting a new step in the acquisition pro-
cess: approval of leads for acquisition targets.
Undoubtedly the CEO is best positioned to initiate leads, as the
CEO's specialized industry knowledge often serendipitously lends
itself to identifying acquisition targets."' Removing the CEO from
this function serves no reasonable purpose. Establishing an addi-
tional step of review, however, bolsters not only the accountabil-
ity of the CEO in determining viable target firms, but also per-
mits the board to act in its purposeful "checks and balances"
capacity. The board may perform a balancing test at the outset,
determining whether acquisition of the target firm conforms to
overall firm strategy and proves financially tenable before a pos-
sible deal gathers momentum.
Moreover, the board can measure the value of the deal more ef-
fectively when considering its purported return, in light of recog-
nized CEO drivers as previously defined, absent the pressure of a
seemingly fully consummated deal. The board retains the free-
dom to make an informed decision before the deal has effectively
been made. The more private CEO drivers the board identifies
and believes will impact a particular acquisition or acquisitions at
the company generally, the greater the probability that early
board involvement in the acquisition process will prevent a value-
decreasing deal.
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (2015) ("The business and affairs of every cor-
poration organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors .... ).
112. See supra Part III.A.
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2. Higher Board Scrutiny
Additionally, the existence of one or multiple private drivers
should trigger a higher level of scrutiny in reviewing proposed
acquisitions. The board must learn to identify and recognize po-
tential deal drivers from the perspective of the CEO. The exist-
ence of any particular drivers does not predispose the deal to fail-
ure, rather these drivers serve as key indicators, or red flags,
requiring additional review of particular capital investments. For
example, noting that an acquisition will increase firm size and
thus perhaps double CEO compensation in the future does not
alone render the deal harmful or inadvisable. Rather, the board
must recognize this as an influencing factor on the CEO and
evaluate the deal in light of its possible weight and impact on
CEO decision making.
The board may utilize key tools to heighten scrutiny and miti-
gate the effects of aggravating drivers. Such tools may include
hiring an independent financial adviser to consult with the board
with respect to each proposed target firm. Additionally, the board
may choose to set a higher hurdle rate based on the CEO's past
acquisition performance. And, to heighten scrutiny in light of
multiple private drivers, a board might require deal review by an
acquisition committee populated solely by independent directors.
The level of scrutiny cannot, however, hinge on the presence of
any one driver, nor should heightened scrutiny require evidence
of all drivers. Instead, the board should utilize a totality of the
circumstances approach, increasing scrutiny based on the number
of drivers present and their potential interplay. The board also
needs to weigh the potential implications of each driver and the
likelihood of the effects occurring. For example, if the board de-
termines the CEO may be swayed by the increase in firm size, yet
knows the firm intends to sell a major division, leaving the firm
relatively the same at year-end, the board can conclude that this
particular driver is unlikely to impact decision making. The ac-
quisition will cause the firm to grow temporarily, but overall firm
size will stay comparable, making annual CEO compensation un-
likely to change.
Determining the level of scrutiny may prove challenging. The
board should track both the various drivers at play in each poten-
tial acquisition deal as well as the foreseeable effects of each driv-
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er. Many drivers may prove pertinent to the CEO in all acquisi-
tions, while others may be deal specific. If the board ascertains
the presence of a particular driver, however, and determines a re-
sulting impact is more than likely to occur, the board should
track the driver more closely. A clear documentation of these
drivers can facilitate discussion amongst the board regarding the
drivers at play and whether current processes are sufficient to al-
lay any potential threat.
a. Payment Changes: Adjusting CEO Compensation Packages
i. Discounting Firm Size
In conjunction with process changes, payment changes may
prove effective tools in mitigating the potential downside of ac-
quisitions driven predominantly by CEOs' private interests. For
example, firm size drives CEO compensation."3 Oftentimes, this
may persuade a CEO to take on acquisitions for the sake of firm
growth, increasing his or her compensation in lock step. Unfortu-
nately, although the firm does in fact grow in size, historically the
return on investment proves less than desirable."4 Desirable in-
creases in compensation perpetuate the cycle of acquisitions for
the sake of acquisitions-growth for the sake of compensation.
The board of directors should recognize the impact that firm
size bears on CEO compensation and diminish the nexus between
firm size and compensation by establishing an adjusted measure
of firm size when determining annual CEO compensation. For
example, suppose that a firm is valued at $1 billion prior to ac-
quisition and $1.2 billion after acquisition, but the acquisition,
according to firm metrics, proves wholly unsuccessful. Assuming
the firm determines CEO compensation by firm size and compar-
ative compensation at peer companies, the board would likely ap-
prove compensation based on firms valued at $1.2 billion. In-
stead, however, the board should discount the firm size to the
original $1 billion given the inflated figure produced by the failed
acquisition. Alternatively, the board might choose to give "credit"
for the increase in firm size for the purpose of CEO compensation
over time with more "credit" given (in terms of the increase in
113. See supra Part III.B.1.
114. See supra Part III.B.1.
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size of peer companies used for compensation analysis) as the ac-
quisition proves itself profitable over several years.
Perhaps the clearest method for determining the adjusted firm
size would derive from the assigned hurdle rate for a particular
acquisition. If the strategy proved fruitless and the acquisition
fell short of the hurdle rate by a certain percentage, that particu-
lar acquisition would be discounted from the total firm size by the
compensation committee.
ii. Instituting Acquisition Clawbacks
Lack of direct accountability may permit CEO private drivers
to dominate the CEO's acquisition analysis. As an alternative to
adjusting compensation by acquisition performance as an acquisi-
tion proves itself, the board might employ a clawback provision."'
Using this technique, the CEO would be paid his or her bonuses
and other compensation components giving full credit for an ac-
quisition. The clawback would then provide the firm with an op-
portunity to reclaim compensation in the future if it determines
that the compensation should not have been awarded because the
deal did not enhance firm value.116 Incorporating clawback provi-
sions in executive compensation contracts may improve manage-
rial decision making. "[E]xecutives appear to be more careful
when making acquisition decisions" once a clawback provision is
in place, as evidenced by improved M&A announcement returns
and a decreased willingness to engage in poor acquisitions.117 The
115. Clawback provisions became an important issue in executive compensation in the
wake of the 2007-2008 credit crisis. Because the financial results of the lenders were ex-
tremely positive in the years leading up to the credit crisis, executives received large bo-
nuses. When, just a short time later, the value of the lenders' portfolios was written down,
the results no longer justified the compensation. Where there were no clawback provi-
sions, executives had an incentive to frontload company earnings, and most managed to
hold on to inflated compensation. See Joann S. Lublin & Charles Forelle, Recovering Bo-
nuses Remains Infrequent Despite Emphasis on Corporate Reform, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12,
2004), http://online.wsj.com/news/articlesSB109752837308242257.
116. Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct national securities exchanges
to prohibit listing any security of a company that does not adopt a clawback policy in com-
pliance with section 954. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 954 (2011). To date, however, only a
company restatement triggers this clawback policy. Id. This article argues firms should
broaden the application of clawbacks and implement clawback provisions to recapture
CEO pay linked with acquisitions, including bonuses.
117. Anna Bergman Brown et al., M&A Decisions and US Firms' Voluntary Adoptions
of Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts, 42 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 237,
268 (2015); see also Yan Liu et al., Corporate Governance, Bank Mergers and Executive
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clawback provision would serve to sever, or at least weaken, the
link between growing a firm and growing a paycheck, permitting
only successful deals to contribute to the latter.
Implementing clawback provisions will encourage CEOs to lis-
ten to the market and make more informed acquisition decisions.
A study by Professors Anna B. Brown, Paquita Y. Davis-Friday,
Lale Guler, and Carol Marquardt indicates that board decision-
making may improve after adopting clawback provisions. '18 The
authors found that when M&A announcement returns were nega-
tive, firms were more likely to adopt clawback provisions. '9 Addi-
tionally, firms that adopted clawback provisions experienced
more favorable announcement returns after the clawback adop-
tion.2° The authors hypothesized this "suggest[ed] that [a] claw-
back adoption significantly improves managerial decision-
making" and leads to a higher likelihood of financial success in
subsequent acquisitions.2' This may result from the correlation
between adoption of clawback provisions and reductions in infor-
mation asymmetry.'22 As noted previously, such information
asymmetry often obstructs board involvement and may prevent
boards from effectively reviewing proposed acquisitions.
Compensation 3, 5, 10, 13 (Henley Bus. Sch., Univ. of Reading, Discussion Paper No. ICM-
2014-18, 2014) https://www.henley.ac.uk/files/pdf/research/papers-publicationsICM-2014-
18%2 OLiu%20et%20al.pdf (finding that, in a study of 478 U.S. bank mergers from 1995 to
2012, post-merger changes in CEO bonuses were significantly negatively correlated with
the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank, suggesting that bonus com-
pensation is not consistent with optimal contracting and that firms might benefit from
new compensation structures).
118. Anna Bergman Brown et al., supra note 117, at 268. The sample drew primarily
from the Corporate Library 2010 clawback database. Id. at 239. The original sample con-
tained 736 firms of which 98 were coded as not having clawbacks and eliminated, reducing
the sample to 638 firms. Id. at 251. The author further eliminated 199 firms that received
funding as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Id. The study included only
variables that significantly explained the likelihood of transaction completion and, there-
fore, would benefit from adoption of clawback provisions. Id. at 246-47. In addition to the
Corporate Library clawback sample of 519 firms, the authors also identified 58 firms that
mention the word clawback in their proxy statements and adopted provisions by 2010. Id.
at 251. They added these hand collected firms to the Corporate Library sample. Id. This
yielded an initial voluntary clawback adoption sample of 577 firms with adoption dates
ranging from 2001 to 2010. Id.
119. Id. at 268.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 239.
122. Id. at 268; Mai Iskandar-Datta & Yonghong Jia, Valuation Consequences of Claw-





Despite continued evidence controverting the value of acquisi-
tions, the strategic choice to subsume additional, smaller entities
is one that will continue-embedded in the past and future of
corporate strategy. This does not mean, however, that boards
must accept the continuing negative returns. Instead, boards en-
gaged in acquisitive strategies should recognize and identify the
key private drivers listed in this paper, deciphering these impacts
on CEO decision making, and analyzing how such drivers might
derail returns on acquisitions. By creating a matrix that illumi-
nates the presence of such drivers and estimates the impact each
might have on the CEO's decision making, the board empowers
itself to conscientiously adopt a level of scrutiny appropriate for
each transaction. Additionally, the board can implement changes
to the acquisition process, requiring CEOs to vet potential targets
at an initial board review-in essence requiring board approval
before the courting phase begins. Further, the compensation
committee can adopt clawback provisions and adjust firm size
when determining CEO compensation packages. Discounting firm
size when setting comparative firms for compensation determina-
tion remains a unique mechanism for incentivizing strong acqui-
sitions and eliminating unjust rewards for financially unsuccess-
ful deals. These strategies may work to curb potentially danger-
ous drivers and to achieve better decision making and stronger
corporate governance in acquisitive firms.
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Source: Deal Boom Feeds on Surging Stocks, WAIL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://online, wsj.comarticlesdeal-boom-feeds-on-surging-stocks-1416270817.
